Similarities and Differences of Raison D’etat and Realpolitik free essay sample

The essence of raison d’etat was â€Å"that the interest of stability the legitimate crowned heads of the states of Europe had to be preserved†¦ and that, above all, relations among states had to be determined by consensus among like minded rulers. † (Kissinger, 104) With the rising power of monarchies, and the loss of the church sanction, raison d’etat overtook past medieval ways. This balance of power in Europe proved more effective in maintaining peace and order, which, at this time, held merit. The French Napoleon III, and the German Otto von Bismarck began realpolitik, which replaced Richelieu’s policy. These men ignored the ideas of raison d’etat, and felt the relations among states should be based on power and ability. Once France and Germany (under Napoleon III, and Bismarck’s rule) began to make power moves exclusively beneficial to themselves, often times at the expense of the other states, raison d’etat was more or less abandoned as a policy. Raison d’etat introduced a lot of the ideas that realpolitik maintained. These two policies were not entirely opposite. Raison d’etat introduced the concepts of separating church and state, and that the powers of Europe must stay balanced to maintain order. Under this philosophy, each state could focus on themselves, while maintaining an equilibrium with the other states. Raison d’etat replaced the medieval law of universal moral values. The concept of raison d’etat â€Å"was simply an extension of conventional wisdom. Its primary goal was to prevent domination by one state and to preserve the international order; it was not designed to prevent conflicts, but to limit them. † (Kissinger, 67). This fact of raison d’etat may have opened the door for realpolitik, as it was considerably facilitated by rising nationalism, and unrest among the states. This policy kept Europe at peace for a notable amount of time, but eventually the states wanted to expand and further their influence and control. Realpolitik was the notion that international and internal relations among the European states were based on power; the strongest state would prevail. Once realpolitik replaced raison d’etat, the days of principle were gone (Kissinger, 106). â€Å"No longer was there talk of unity of crowned heads or of harmony among the ancient states of Europe. Under†¦realpolitik, foreign politics became a contest of strength. † (Kissinger, 121). This philosophy maintained that the state’s interest was solely furthering and strengthening itself. The interests of other states were mostly irrelevant, unless it directly affected one’s own international or domestic position. These two philosophies shared numerous similarities. Both of them operated with the state as the moral standards. These policies maintained that doing what is best for the state surmounts religious and legitimist standpoints. Another similarity was that a policy of national self-interest guided both raison d’etat and realpolitik. Both of these policies prompted European leaders to disregard legitimists, especially when their beliefs would hinder freedom of action of the state (Kissinger, 123). Both principles concentrated their efforts on geographic and political gains, both national and international (Cassels, 70). Finally, both of these philosophies were met with the same disbelief; those who supported legitimacy considered both intolerable, because they undermined the importance of balance of power, and unification of Europe. These policies held the state above the church, and individual interests above Europe’s as a whole. Raison d’etat and realpolitik also had several dissimilarities. â€Å"Raison d’etat constitutes the end purpose of a foreign policy, [whereas] realpolitik implies no more than a methodology to achieve any sort of goal. † (Cassels, 70) Raison d’etat was more of a policy of defensive politics, where the balance of power, and a generally non-hostile atmosphere were most important. Conversely, realpolitik was offensive; always looking to expand and better the state, whether or not that meant domination of other states’ and their holdings. Realpolitik held little to no regard for fairness towards other states, or what would be in others’ best interests. This policy was one of brute strength; the most powerful and effective state would gain control. Bismarck, the previously regarded realpolitik originator, incited war between his own state of Prussia and Napoleon’s France. He did this by â€Å"editing† a Prussian telegram to France, making it look like a â€Å"royal snub†. The insulted French demanded war, and Prussia won a swift and unquestionable victory. This realpolitik oriented manipulation made it much simpler for Bismarck to unify Germany, his ultimate goal (Kissinger, 118). Realpolitik meant to destroy the world of raison d’etat, and replace it with a bigger, more aggressive system of international and internal relations. Raison d’etat put a lot of importance on domestic relations in Europe, while realpolitik did not. Once realpolitik surmounted raison d’etat, eventually â€Å"nationalism unleavened by democracy turned increasingly chauvinistic, while democracy without responsibility grew sterile. (Kissinger, 135). Politics in Europe came to be based on raw power due to realpolitik. Raison d’etat could be thought of as a softer, more inclusive policy, while realpolitik was more separatist, and even more self-interested. Raison d’etat operated more defensively, only preventing conflicts, whereas realpolitik would incite them if that meant getting ahead. Both held the state’s interests ab ove the church, and the rest of Europe. These philosophies believed the state should gain as much as possible, politically and geographically. They were also both met with resistance, but they held one cause to a high degree, which no statesman could deny, and that was patriotism. They both held that rather than being judged by God, the state needed to be judged by what worked (Kissinger, 126) which is still the system in place today. Works Cited Kissinger, Henry. Diplomacy. New York: Simon amp; Schuster, 1994. Print. Cassels, Alan. Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World. London: Routledge, 1996. Print.